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Cases of corporate frauds with financial instruments count on simulacra 
of accountability. Based on grounded research, this study considered cas-
es that were conducted for years without being detected causing billion-
aire injury to investors. The objective was to present how they bypassed 
internal controls, corporate governance, and all regulatory apparatus 
using substantive and symbolic resources at organization level analysis. 
An extensive analysis allowed perceive a common modus operandi that is 
described here organized by objectives. This paper also suggests a direc-
tion for accountability improvement.
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1. Introduction
Accountability presumes control over what is beensaid about economic and financial situation of abusiness. Thus managers act in order to construct
and enact a sense of being accountable. This information
management does not mean that all managers hide, omit or
falsify information, but it does not exclude these intentions.
Economic and financial situation is computed by
accounting system based on three phases: recognition,
measurement and disclosure (International Accounting
Standards Committee Foundation)[1]. Recognition is the
process of incorporating in financial statements an element
that has the probability of any future economic benefit
associated with it will flow or from the entity and, when
it has a cost or value that can be measured with reliability.
Measurement is the process of determining the monetary
amounts at which the elements will be recognized and
carried in financial statements. Disclosure relates to the
set of information provided about the financial position, 
including statements, notes and supplementary schedules 
that may be useful to a wide range of users in making eco-
nomic decisions. These include any relevant information 
about risks and uncertainties affecting the entity and any 
resources and obligations not recognized in statements. A 
survey conducted across 40 countries just before Enron 
collapse, indicated that most of CFOs respondents consid-
ered the lack of adequate disclosure to be a issue of more 
concern that the lack of effective accounting guidelines. 
Only in United Kingdom the perception was inverse [2]. 
Economic and financial information then, can be ma-
nipulated at any part of this process. It is possible a) to 
recognize item that does not exist, b) to attribute false 
value to items and c) to omit or create (falsify) relevant 
information. 
It was chosen four cases of corporate financial fraud to 
analyse their modus operandi and highlight how they ma-
nipulated economic and financial information along theses 
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phases - which should provide accountability for users. 
They are two notorious cases from United Stated and two 
from Brazil.
Enron fabricated revenue, mismarked forward curve 
and risk analysis, simulated transactions volume and 
omitted several information about off-balance sheet part-
nerships [3]. Madoff simulated transactions volume and 
profitability [4]. Boi Gordo recognized inexistent cattle, 
simulated profit with related parties and omitted infor-
mation about them [5]. Banco Santos simulated profit, 
investment and loans operations, falsified risk classifica-
tion, issued irregular bonds and omitted information about 
off-balance partnerships [6].
All of these cases of corporate fraud has used finan-
cial instruments to perpetrate frauds, were conducted for 
more than 5 years, and caused injury up to EU 1 billion. 
Management controls and corporate governance apparatus 
were not enough to deter them. 
This paper focuses on substantive and symbolic re-
sources used by managers to perpetrate a corporate finan-
cial fraud and to hide it, avoiding been perceived by em-
ployees, auditors, regulatory agencies and general public.  
There are several cases of corporate frauds in literature. 
Probably chosen cases are not so different from them to 
deserve a special treatment.  Notwithstanding, they were 
too explored by media and so there are plenty information 
available to a deepened study. The extensive analysis al-
lowed perceiving a common modus operandi. The purpose 
of this paper is to describe it in an organized way. 
When we understand what happened through great 
scandals and divulgate it in a systemic way, we can easily 
recognize a several other cases in minor scale of pyramids 
and larceny crimes that affect million of people around the 
world even in nowadays. It is important to advice people 
that some extravagant events or characteristics are not iso-
lated facts but are part of an orchestrated plan. 
Some huge improvements were made on enforcements 
after and because of those cases but 2008 crisis showed 
us that they were not enough to avoid malpractices and 
big frauds. Actors in this crisis also used main elements 
presented on prior frauds. It is worthy to point out that 
fraudsters are always one step ahead, especially from 
enforcements, but their modus operandi preserve some 
elements in common [7]. So the purpose of this paper is not 
to discuss the effectiveness of improvements on preven-
tion and detection mechanism but prior to highlight what 
always fraudsters will explore. 
2. Conceptual Fundamentals
Baucus [8] developed an important multivariate model that 
identified three groups of situational precedent factors: 
pressure, opportunity and predisposition to fraud. Ma-
cLean [9] introduced the logic of cognitive frames as he 
argued that the decision to participate on deviant action or 
not is unclear. He improved the multivariate model but he 
focused on the sensemaking process to redefine deviant 
practices without linking them to antecedent factors. Mis-
angyi, Weaver, and Elms [10] contributed to this specific 
literature adding the way in which meanings are attributed 
to substantive resources. However they focused on socie-
tal level of analysis.
Despite this effort to consolidate resources into a mul-
tivariate model, literature about corporate fraud has been 
too fragmented. Resources have been more deeply ex-
plored at each of these various levels: individual, organi-
zation, industry [11], economic [12], political and regulatory 
system [13], and society [14]. Some of these developments 
were selected here in order to give support to concepts 
involved on what was observed on cases and to point out 
the general context on which fraud was perpetrated.
At the level of society literature there are references 
to anomie theory that leads with social disorganization 
of values [15]; to the pressure that certain social values put 
on individuals [16, 17] and with the role educational system 
plays related to these values[14,18]. The social disorganiza-
tion of values turns diffuse the distinction between what 
is acceptable from what is not. And from this difficulty 
to distinguish what is acceptable flourished illegitimate 
forms to obtain success under pressure. Fraudsters execute 
practices inside and outside organization that are focused 
on turning diffuse this distinction, and these practices are 
better explained at organization and individual level. The 
education system does not emphasize the condemnation 
of non-ethical behaviour. And worst, reinforce a practice 
where the appearance of good performance is more im-
portant than the good performance itself [14]. This is the 
expression in business environment of what Boorstin [19] 
pointed in general issues: ‘(…) we are haunted not by re-
ality, but by those images we have put in place of reality’. 
According to Baudrillard [20], instead of communicating 
and giving sense, information avoids it and is limited to 
enact communication and enact sense in a dissuasive sim-
ulacrum. 
All cases present actions intentionally taken to influ-
ence social perception of company, of business and of 
people involved on it. These practices clearly take advan-
tage of this absence and inversion of values on behalf of 
fraud.
At the level of economic, political and regulatory sys-
tems literature explores regulatory mechanisms [12] and 
wrong incentive systems [21], both as source of opportuni-
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ties. Literature also explores the perception of punishment
system [13,22] as inhibition and deterrence factor. There is
another perspective that considers fraud as systemic, part
of our economic environment where there are demand and
supply of corruption[23]. Notwithstanding there are
divergent results about opportunities, incentives and
inhibition factors[10].
The regulatory system can provide an opportunity for
its inadequacy (with perverse incentives) or for its absence
at all. This absence can be consequence of a usual delay
between a new business or transaction and its comprehen-
sion and regulation [12] or can be consequence of an inten-
tional deregulation process [21]. Anyway, in the absence of
regular norms, spontaneous norms emerge to legitimate
practices that reinforce what was pointed at societal level
about the importance of appearance in place of reality.
‘Do whatever you can, even deceive about or disguise any
potentially disadvantageous aspects you know of, in order
to show a growing profit rate’ [12]. Note that author said ‘to
show’ and not ‘to reach’.
The regulatory mechanisms are presented as an im-
provement in terms of corporate governance but some of
them simply reduce probability of being punished or re-
duce its severity [12]. An instrument that should be used as
an inhibition factor instead smooth penalties and percep-
tion of negative effects. As pointed out by Hake [24], while
accounting firms turned to be more dependent on revenues
from clients, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 reduced the penalties for accounting and legal
fraud. According to Ivancevich et al. [13] deterrence is
based on three factors: severity, celerity and certainty of
punishment. If there is a lenient punishment, many possi-
bilities to avoid conviction or the process is too long, this
system will not deter but stimulate fraudsters that could
evaluate the crime to be worth the risk [ 25].
In the other hand, too severe punishment as putting the
defendant out of business can also stimulate misconduct
[22].
The regulatory system becomes an opportunity also
because of weakness of its institution. Duran [12] relates,
for example, that in spite of the increasingly complex of
financial sector, SEC is understaffed and under funded.
SEC’s staff is inexperienced and receives salaries under
those in private sector.
Under this context of weak institutions, spontaneous
rules that reduce penalties or probabilities of being con-
victed, a natural delay of regulation of new transactions,
and a market of corruption, it is easy to think that a good
image management allows company survive committing
fraud for a certain time without being noted.
Literature at organization level advanced to ways to de-
tect and prevent non-ethical behaviour. They include inter-
nal controls [26], ethical code and compliance-ineffective 
if used as a checklist and not incorporated to 
organizational cultural[27]; organizational culture that 
instead of reinforce ethical behaviour, incentives non-
ethical actions by ratio-nalization and socialization 
processes [28]; and corporate governance as effective 
mechanism of prevention but also limited in efficacy 
when internal processes are designed to waive Board 
responsibilities for deviant actions [29]. Nonetheless 
Ashforth et al. [23] point that it is not unusual that these 
systems have a ceremonial role as a checklist of best 
practices and are not prepared for an effective pre-
vention.
At this level are the main practices to influence percep-
tions at individual, society and regulatory environment,
like internal controls specially designed for spread control,
diffuse responsibilities and not register certain irregulari-
ties [17].
Organizational culture can avoid or promote fraud. It
can avoid fraud emphasizing ethic behaviour [27,30] or can
promote fraud, emphasizing values related to non-ethical
behaviour [28]. When organizational culture emphasizes
that goals should be achieved anyway, a perverse incen-
tive is emphasized. Perverse results have been produced
by compensation plan stimulating gains even by corrup-
tion [31].
This incentive can be empowered by regulatory and
legal sanctions. Regulatory and legal sanctions can incen-
tive fraud as individuals do not think there is something
wrong and trust company has good practices that are in
accordance with those rules. Accreditations and ratings
increase the list of influence factors [26] that confer legit-
imacy to what company is doing. Social sanction is the
same, but it is mediated not only by organizational culture
(ethic code) but also by social values. External perception,
then, can be managed by active company's behaviour to
influence it [26].
Internal perception and people involvement count on
other resources. Ethic scripts can limit perception of de-
viant behaviour that is out of them, leading to atrophy of
competence [30] and to adherence to it.
The adherence by cognitive [32] is achieved by routini-
zation, socialization and rationalizing discourses. Routin-
ization refers to systems and procedures that are spread
enough to set apart culpability of employee, turning fraud
transaction diffuse [29]. Socialization process [28] avoids be-
haviour dissonant in the group. Individuals are stimulated
to integrate themselves in order to assimilate social norms
and organization culture. Individuals that perceive some
wrongdoing or even some incoherence adhere to organi-
zation behaviour in order to survive in the group [32]. Ra-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i1.385
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tionalizing ideologies provide a repertory for individuals 
justify what they are doing, hiding the deviant nature of 
the act [33].
The objective of this paper is to present the integrated 
conditions for some big cases of corporate fraud and indi-
cate possibilities of improving accountability.
3. Methods
The present research was conducted under a grounded ap-
proach. Data were analyzed by procedures adapted from 
document analysis [34] and discourse analysis [35] methods. 
It was possible to describe facts and identify resources 
used along fraud mainly by document analysis. Discourse 
analysis was used mainly to identify how facts were 
re-signified to prepare context for fraud. Both methods al-
lowed apprehend the content and insights about phenome-
non studied [36]: corporate financial fraud.
Cases were chosen for attending better to theoretical 
requirements and for their disposal of accessible infor-
mation. All cases described big frauds using financial 
instruments in Brazil and in United States, but at different 
sectors. Boi Gordo was an agribusiness (BR), Banco San-
tos was a bank (BR), Enron was an energy business (USA) 
and Madoff was a fund investment (USA). It follows a 
brief description of each case. 
Enron grew from a sleepy natural gas pipeline to a 
trading colossus with products like gas, electricity, wa-
ter distribution and many other businesses. In five years 
(1995-2000), Enron grew 900% in terms of revenue when 
other giant companies grew about 100% during the same 
period [3]. Since 1986 many companies were created in 
290 countries including tax heavens [37,38,39]. For many 
years, the Enron group had hidden losses spread in off 
shores, out of balance sheet. By 1990, electricity market 
was liberalized at United States and Enron incremented 
its scheme of false profits. This accounting fraud allowed 
Kenneth Lay, his Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow 
and their families and friends made money-trading stocks. 
In 1999, Jeffrey Skilling jointed to them to implement 
the new liberal business consisted on a derivative energy 
market. This business turned to be the focus of group as 
it was used to create revenue based on false future values, 
sustaining stock prices. The fraudulent operation persist-
ed for about 16 years until scandal and resulted in 4,000 
people losing their jobs at group. It also resulted on Arthur 
Andersen collapse with 28,000 employees. Injury was es-
timated about EUR 18bn [22,37,40]. 
Bernard Madoff founded Bernard L. Madoff Invest-
ment Securities LLC in 1960 as a brokerage business [41]. 
In order to counterbalance the growing intense competi-
tion on brokerage, Madoff created a separate investment 
advisory business that targeted a select group of invited 
investors and promised returns that were 100% safe and 
regularly good (between 10 and 12% a year). Target, 
however, was not so select as claimed. Scheme included 
59 managed companies, 339 funds identified around the 
world [42] and some great banks [37]. These returns were 
supposed to be obtained from investments in specific port-
folios of stocks and options [4,41,43]. Fraud consisted on the 
simple fact that there were no financial transactions for 
clients. Fraud was carried for about 18 years and injured 
estimated 13,500 investors [44] that lost approximately 
EUR 13bn (also estimated). 
Paulo Roberto de Andrade founded Boi Gordo at 1988, 
when he assumed his family traditional business. In 13 
years, business grew 72.500% in terms of cows, spread 
on 111 own farms and 29 leased farms at 5 states and 18 
companies [45]. Business was pioneer and consisted on 
a new financing system for which they received many 
awards [45]. Investor (partner) signed a contract by arroba. 
Boi Gordo used his money to buy calf and feed it, retain-
ing 10% as administrative fee. The great attractive was the 
guarantee of 42% of gains for this period of 18 months, as 
normal agribusiness gained about 9% for the same period. 
Corporate fraud consisted in using investor's money to 
buy lands (private farms) and make many other invest-
ment (genetic, animal food etc.) despite the fact investors 
had no participation on them. This fraud caused injury 
for 30,000 investors, of about EUR 1bn, persisted for 12 
years until scandal and fine was extinguished after 5 years 
from bankruptcy without condemnation [46].
Edemar Cid Ferreira founded Procid Participações 
(holding) and Banco Santos at 1989 [6,47,48]. From these 
companies a group was constituted. Federal Policy identi-
fied 225 companies in total [49]. By 2002 the Banco Santos 
was one of the most important re-leaser of BNDES1 funds. 
One of them operated 82 funds by 2004 [6]. Banco Santos 
was different by its pioneer in international relation, by 
notable cultural sponsorship and had a different service 
from competitors, focusing on medium and big size com-
panies with financial problems. For them, bank offered 
good conditions of lending without those guarantees 
required by competitors. Other niche were wealthy indi-
viduals and for them bank offered exceptional conditions 
of return, much more than market could offer. Corporate 
1   BNDES - National Bank for Social and Economic Development. It lends public resources.
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fraud consisted on using investor's money to buy bonds of
paper companies (belonging to the group) and so deviate
this funds to personal wealthy. This money at paper com-
panies was spread into third parties and was evaded, part
of them to holdings at tax heavens. Some off shores were
used for funds evasion and money laundering, offering
an illicit service for a public that demanded it. The group
includes also a mirror-company named Bank of Europe, at
Antilles. They developed a sophisticated scheme involv-
ing this Bank and many other companies [e.g. 50; 51].
This fraud caused injury for 2,000 investors of about EUR
1.1bn, persisted for 9 years.
Text material were mainly analysed by document anal-
ysis method [34] in order to reconstruct history of each
case. Part of this material and media material was anal-
ysed by discourse analysis method [35]. The objective was
to understand the way discursive resources were used to
prepare a context for action [52].
4. Analysis and Discussion
The recognition, measurement and disclosure of economic
and financial situation of a business should be accountable
as financial information is fundamental to gain respect
and credibility of market, investors and society. During a
corporate financial fraud these information were manipu-
lated in order to avoid questionings about business even
when there were red flags that could not be perfectly hid-
den. This manipulation is conducted by accounting frauds
as recognizing what is not real, attributing false value
to items, omitting fundamentals information or creating
facts. However all these practices are not enough to hide
negative numbers or facts. Then symbolic resources are
used to create a positive sense making toward business, as
an illusion to blear analysis. False numbers allow false po-
sition in rankings intensively propagated by media. Diffi-
culties to audit them and economic pressure over auditing
firms and rating agencies lead to favourable opinion about
business. This sense making results in favourable media
by positive meaning attributed to negative facts. These re-
sources reinforce a social sanction, legitimizing business
as successful.
The analysis of cases indicated that when there is a
clear intention to fraud, internal conditions for it are
prepared and sustained.
Then, the modus operandi contemplates resources used
to guarantee people participation, to dissipate fraud and
dilute responsibilities and, to create positive sense making
about business.
Business is structured in order to allow projecting an im-
age without apparent dissonance to substance. The lack of
dissonance was fundamental to construct confidence with 
investors, regulators agents, media and employees. Many 
substantive and symbolic resources were used with success 
and business continued to expand. The modus operandi 
drove business to success as a self-fulfilling prophecy in a 
manner similar that described by Boorstin [19].
The result of analysis was organized by objectives as 
follows, with some examples of each case.
4.1 To Get Involvement of Executives, Employees 
and External People
The participation of people can be direct or indirect, con-
sciously or not. Resources like compensation scheme and 
social sanction were intensively used. There were also 
indicia of active corruption. 
All cases used hiring process or good compensation 
plans in order to get their complicity or even direct par-
ticipation. Banco Santos hired people greed enough to 
execute clearly and not so clearly illicit transactions for 
a good financial compensation [51]. At Enron commodity 
traders had hidden losses by mismarking forward curves 
as they were compensated by larger bonus based on profits 
[39]. At Boi Gordo, qualified employees had bonuses higher 
than market and some of them were paid by offshore [45]. 
At Madoff, deviant practices were executed by a limited 
group of 12 employees of friends and relatives. They fal-
sified tickets of operation and then extract to investors [41]. 
Indirect or unconsciously participation was extensive-
ly gotten by economic compensation and routinization, 
mediated by social sanction. Some employees behave like 
soldiers just executing fragmented transactions and are 
compensated for good results on them. Public recognition 
and ratings retro-feed these policies, as employees felt 
certain comfort for it. Banco Santos hired idoneous peo-
ple to project an image of conformity [51] and Enron hired 
‘bright minds’ from Stanford and Harvard with exception-
al salary and bonuses and socializing them into ‘Enron 
way of doing business’, leaving all other loyalties behind 
[38]. At Madoff, a compensation scheme was for feeder 
funds. Some fund admitted they knew that Madoff's strat-
egy was not what he said and possibly he had privilege in-
formation – which is crime. Madoff, distinct from market 
practices, received just a market rate commission on each 
trade. Distributors appropriated the fees, and part of them 
survived just because Madoff existed and this compensat-
ed the risk of some illegality [53]. 
It is interesting to note that there were indicia of active 
corruption to execute transactions outside company. Boi 
Gordo bought vaccines labels (and not vaccines) in order 
to pretend they had those cows. Who sold all these labels 
could have questioned what was going on. They also falsi-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i1.385
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fied animal transportation legal note. Instead of 4 animals,
they delivered a note with 41,717 animals. It was a visible
fraud, as 41 thousand animals would require more than
one truck to be transported [45]. These actions enacted a
cattle size necessary to justify sham asset transfers among
related companies and then improve financial condition
on statements. These facts indicate that there were 
some active corruption.
There were more subtle indicia of corruption at Enron,
Madoff and Banco Santos cases but none of them were
convicted by active corruption what limit affirmations
about it.
In response to several complaints received against
Madoff, SEC's conduct on investigations was at least
questionable. Team assembled was relatively inexperi-
enced and conducted general questions or even pro form
questions. In fact, SEC never conducted a Ponzi scheme
examination or investigation of Madoff [4]. At Enron cas-
es, indicia were more commented. SEC allowed a mark-
to-market procedure without obvious questionings about
assumptions [24,43]. If there were financial contributions to
SEC to favour frauds it is not possible to affirm but cer-
tainly there was political influence that minimize concerns
about those businesses. Economical importance of busi-
ness could be enough to exercise political influence.
Other people were involved just in name of friendship
without a clear notion of what was going on or the propor-
tion of it. For this kind of involvement public recognition
and ratings played a fundamental role. Banco Santos, En-
ron, Boi Gordo used third people as a front of paper com-
panies and offshore. His brother-in-law audited Madoff’s
business and he justified it by the secret maintenance.
Confidence was the main factor here.
Then routinization, public recognition and ratings ap-
peared as important factors to construct confidence and so
get people involved, consciously or not.
4.2 To Turn Fraud and Culpabilities Diffuse and
to Routinize It
Schemes include the spread of fraud and culpabilities in
order to turn difficult to be perceived by employees un-
consciously involved and to give some protection to those
consciously involved. This is also necessary to avoid ac-
counting frauds detection by auditors, regulatory agents
and analysts.
The substantive resources included a centralization of
command and simultaneous decentralization of operation
in many companies, part in name of front persons, out of
formal group or with limited capital. Command central-
ized was necessary to orchestrate transactions and funds
deviation. Business turned too complex as transactions
were fragmented into companies leading to parallels con-
trols and allowing accounting frauds. Information systems 
and processes started at one company and ended at anoth-
er and, employees of both did not have entire information 
and control over transactions. 
It was tracked 18 companies at Boi Gordo (only 1 
under regulation) and 225 at Banco Santos (19 of formal 
group and few under regulation). At both cases, com-
panies served to spread control, to avoid confirming the 
existence of real guarantees and to simulate gains. They 
did it, for example, by creating false transactions between 
them and by executing transaction at one company di-
vulgating a risk classification of the group and not of that 
company, which was a bad one [6,45]. At Enron, Stars War 
protagonists named some companies with limited capital, 
in 290 countries, out of formal group. They were used to 
simulate business volume of transactions and profits [38,39]. 
At all cases, it was difficult to convict all involved by their 
responsibility on fraud scheme as many employees argued 
they were executing orders or corporate procedures [6,22]. 
All cases presented red flags on financial information 
and operation along fraud execution. Inconsistencies were 
seen as function of complex nature of business what legit-
imated its differentiation from others. 
Rationalizing discourses, sense making process and 
social and regulatory sanctions had helped to give sense 
of modernity, conformity and differentiation, legitimating 
extraordinary competence and gains in spite of question-
ing the routine of deviant behaviour. These actions are 
described at the following item.
4.3 To Create and Sustain a Positive Sense Mak-
ing About Business 
It is important to convince people that business is a case 
of success recognized by specialized public (as auditors, 
regulatory agencies) and general public. This positive 
sense making serves as social sanction and facilitates ra-
tionalization discourses inside and outside company. 
A symbolic resource for deceiving public is the ex-
ploration of specific values to attract investors and blear 
analysts by projecting a genius and innovative image. 
Banco Santos, for example, explored art market to project 
a sophisticated image, and so their clients could feel they 
were also sophisticated. Boi Gordo explored the image of 
being bright and pioneer on agribusiness financing. Enron 
was known by its bright minds, ‘master of universe’, as 
their clients should also be. Madoff explored the idea of 
exclusive club and secret. Awards and detach position on 
rankings reinforce the success of these genius.
A substantive form of avoid questioning about business 
is how they set them. They operated outside boundaries of 
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legislation, regulation or dominant technical knowledge. 
These main resources combined enabled the construc-
tion of a context to sustain fraud. From these, each case 
developed their fraudulent scheme using other substantive 
and symbolic resources. It follows some comments about 
how they drilled down their strategies. 
As there was no transaction at all, the Madoff's in-
vestment advisory business was not registered with the 
SEC, thus preventing in-depth external evaluation of its 
practices and performance [4]. Furthermore, investors 
had to invest by feeder funds indicated by Madoff. Great 
firms audited these feeder funds and this gives legitima-
cy to business. These funds could not disclose the name 
of Madoff or his company when dealing with investors, 
as investor's transaction was secret. This arrangement 
prevented access to the business as a whole and its trans-
actions. Then, Madoff, a sophisticated multibillion-dollar 
business, was not audited neither by a great firm neither 
regulated by SEC [54]. 
The secrecy and genius image turned some question-
able procedures to be taken as reasonable. A hedge fund 
should use independent third parties to execute some 
activities, in order to guarantee certain level of compli-
ance, avoiding frauds and assuring that those asset value 
presented were real. Nevertheless, Madoff executed all of 
them internally and feeder funds should believe him. It is 
important to point out that some of them thought Madoff 
had privileged information and accepted the risk. Fraud 
itself consisted on simulating trades with investors' money 
in Fortune 500 stocks hedged against Standard & Poor 
(S&P) Index. Every day, Madoff and his CFO picked 
the stocks that had a good performance and created false 
documents enacting trades with them, giving the sense of 
privilege information. As investors accepted that business 
strategy was a secret, he just informed average prices 
during each day and not actual prices for each transac-
tion, and never answered questions about performance [4]. 
Modus operandi consisted on simulating purchases and 
selling of all stocks within the month, so investors money 
with gains were at cash at the end of the month. Doing so, 
investors would never receive from an intermediary an 
extract with custodian stocks to check their investment. 
By volume that should be trading, he turned to be three 
times the size of the largest known hedge funds in the 
world but most market professionals did not know about 
him or have done transactions with him [54]. Madoff recog-
nized transactions that never existed but no one mistrusted 
[53]. He created returns based on average prices that were 
not possible to be replicated by specialists. They ques-
tioned the possibility of that, but they were not listened 
[4]. They did no divulgate market prices that should com-
pound the false returns. These were some of red flags ig-
nored by investors, feeder funds and SEC [41]. On contrary, 
they constituted on simulacra of governance and success.
This success was sanctioned by SEC behaviour. It re-
ceived the first complaint against Madoff in 1992, and up 
to 1998, there were six. Despite three examinations and 
two investigations conducted, SEC never questioned the 
Ponzi scheme, and the absence of something wrong rein-
forced the good image of Madoff. 
At Enron, public relation was used to minimize any 
chance of relationship [38]. Enron registered false events. It 
enacted a market of big transactions, registering purchases 
within group companies, as they were third parties. In or-
der to convince specialists and media, beyond all account-
ing frauds, Enron constructed a theatre stage to simulate 
a real trading floor and justify the volume of transactions 
and importance of operation. 
Enron falsified measurement process. There was no 
benchmarking price to future market of energy and so it 
could raise price assumption as needed. Enron created 
a market for long-term contracts that exceeded 6 years, 
longer than usual maturity. Therefore, traders mismarked 
forward curve without being questioned. The board, par-
ticularly the audit committee, did not understand statisti-
cal detail neither had information about trading business 
and its effective risk. Despite this complexity, they met 
only five times in 2000. The accuracy of its risk model at 
95% of the time, without a risk management, was also ob-
fuscated by external communication. SEC did not monitor 
how Enron carried out its mark-to-market accounting [38-40]. 
They were genius and this justified the accuracy. 
Enron divulgated information omitting partnerships 
transactions [40] affecting balance sheet; loans disguised 
as energy trades with Citigroup and Chase involvement, 
affecting cash flow statement; a sham asset sale to Merrill 
Lynch with the promise to resale the asset at a minimum 
return, affecting income statement; loans from Citigroup 
disguised as transfer of asset at inflated values to SPEs 
and joint venture not independent, inflating earnings 
and affecting debt position; a complex loan transaction 
issued by a Chase-controlled SPE, producing Canadian 
tax benefits and income benefit. These are examples of 
transactions omitted or hidden on financial statement. It is 
important to detach that Enron would not have been able 
to do it without active participation of some major finan-
cial institutions, well compensated for it [43]. Auditors and 
rating agencies were also well financially compensated for 
ignoring bad signals. They are all increasingly dependent 
on clients' money as SEC's budget is influenced by po-
litical interests [24,40]. Financial and political influence (or 
corruption), lack of knowledge of general and specialist 
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public, awards and favourable media retro-feed a simula-
crum of accountability.
Boi Gordo was also a business under a lack of reg-
ulation and ineffective auditing. It sold contracts under 
a legal apparatus not applicable to that business, just in 
order to confer some legality appealing [45]. About 50% of 
cattle registered on financial statements were inexistent. 
The owner, Paulo Roberto, said that CVM - Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários (Brazilian SEC) had a few auditors 
and they could not verify the existence of cows in loco, 
spread out over 140 farms [55]. Boi Gordo simulated many 
profitable transactions among related companies, outside 
regulator reach. They included transfers of cows (inexis-
tent), assets sale (farms, land) and loans in order to create 
sham guarantee, profits and reduction of debts [5,45]. Paulo 
Roberto deviated investor's funds to private diversified 
business but he re-signified this, promoting this growth as 
a signal of success, developed with only 10% of fees [46]. 
After all, he was a genius as agro business management. 
As some institutional videos claimed, he had ‘the feet on 
the ground and the eyes on the future’ [56].
After the innovative business being regulated by 1998, 
Boi Gordo intensified these transactions with many chang-
es on partnership of companies and intensified accounting 
frauds and omissions. In 2001, an anonymous denounce 
was made to CVM and the investigation resulted on re-
striction for Boi Gordo selling its investment contracts. 
But Boi Gordo innovated again and started to sell the con-
tract by third and related parties outside regulation bound-
aries, but with the same group of employees. The com-
plexities of group constitution did not allow employees 
perceive changes on operation [45]. Mega events, extrav-
agant purchases of cattle and intense positive publicity, 
increased the list of actions in order to obfuscate people to 
question business success. The simulacrum started to ruin 
after two denounces to CVM. 
Banco Santos developed an intricate scheme of 225 
companies to deviate and evade funds and laundering 
money. There were many transactions simulated similar to 
Enron's, as loans among related parties and sale of compa-
nies [51]. However, Banco Santos added to scheme a com-
ponent that would turn the money arresting a very difficult 
challenge: work of arts. Edemar was a mecenas and part 
of related companies were structured to organize mega 
cultural events, and also to do extravagant purchases and 
spread work of arts around the world. 
The bank and the broker companies registered transac-
tions among related parties to create false earnings. One 
example of instruments was used at broker company. The 
broker sold bonds based on loans issued by bank. Bank 
issued loans but required reciprocity of client to invest 
on related companies papers (part of deviating funds 
scheme). Most of these companies had no operational 
activity at all. Complexity included some guarantees de-
posited by clients on Bank of Europe, a mirror company 
of Banco Santos at tax heavens. This relationship among 
companies and investment papers were not explicit for 
none of stakeholders. Central Bank argued there were un-
usual transactions, but not illegal [6,51]. 
Bonds price were over measured, ignoring risk evalu-
ation. Broker company argued that Bank had a risk man-
agement over loans, and bonds were based on them. It 
should be enough to create confidence. Bank employees 
argued risk management of bonds were made by broker 
company. Then, broker dealt junk bonds without being 
perceived by regulators [6]. In order to obfuscate public 
perception about what was going on, an intense marketing 
of competence and sophistication was promoted. So, even 
lending money to companies in difficult situation rejected 
by other institutions, the extravagant result on operation 
was the effective signal of how they were genius. Central 
Bank, BNDES, rating agencies and media started to ques-
tion Banco Santos group business when it was too late 
to recover money. Along many years, the simulacrum of 
accountability was sustained by positive internal and ex-
ternal discourses, by promotion of success on diversified 
businesses and by financial incentives (or corruption) to 
other institutions 
Finally, ethic codes, compliance and corporate gover-
nance practices were used at Banco Santos and Enron to 
avoid internal fraud (against company) and reinforce sense 
making of legitimacy. Another resource was rationalizing 
discourses. They were similar at Enron, Banco Santos and 
Boi Gordo and are synthesized at Table 1. As Madoff had 
no operation at all, these discourses were not necessary.
Table 1. Syntheses of rationalizing discourses
DISCOURSE DESCRIPTION
Denial of re-
sponsibility
Top management attributes deviant actions to opera-
tional employees. Employees attribute to routines and 
procedures. 
External participants do not even know what company 
does; they were just helping a friend (front persons).
Denial of injure Business is good for all; everybody gains. 
Denial of victim Clients are partners; they are qualified, they know the risk and accepted to participate into business. 
Legitimating 
of exceptional 
competence 
The extraordinary result, compensate plan for employ-
ees and business growth are all consequence of a differ-
ential competence that legitimize business. 
5. Conclusion
The study concluded that at corporate financial fraud cas-
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es no management control or regulatory and governance 
apparatus have been enough to prevent and detect it. The 
four cases studied manipulated accounting information in 
recognition, measurement and disclosure. Despite these 
accounting frauds, several red flags could be perceived at 
each case. But they were not considered neither by em-
ployees, auditors, regulatory agencies, investors or gener-
al public. A positive sense making created and sustained 
by companies had a fundamental role to hide frauds and 
disregard red flags. This sense making was constructed 
based on confidence, in genius image, with rationalizing 
discourses and financial and political influence.
In fact many improvements in corporate governance 
were made since these cases and probably many actions 
described here, would be avoided by new norms, laws, 
systems etc. Under contemporaneous context, however, 
fraudsters would adapt these actions to fit another deceiv-
ing way of doing things.  Therefore the fundamental is not 
to focus on actions themselves but to understand for which 
purpose they were used: a) to get involvement of people; 
b) to turn fraud and culpabilities diffuse and routinize it 
and; c) to create and sustain sense making. Fraudster with 
new substantive and symbolic resources will pursue these 
purposes. That’s the essence of the model.
Accountability presumes control over entire business 
structure and modus operandi, what goes beyond account-
ing framework. To improve accountability, auditing and 
regulatory apparatus should include symbolic resources 
analysis integrated to substantive ones available at multi-
ple sources. It should avoid checklist of practices or even 
simple compliance to recognition, measurement and dis-
closures rules. In turn, investors and society should sus-
pect of genius, secrets, exceptional gains and growth. 
Fraudsters were genius but of illusionism. They did 
not have risk management on business but they were ex-
perts on calculating fraud risk and on working without 
being perceived by operational risk systems. As always 
have people greed or ingenious enough, other cases of 
corporate fraud should be avoided by market institutions 
and analysts in an integrative and cooperative way among 
them.
Finally, it is worthy to point out that 2008 crisis 
emerged as a huge fraud perpetrated not by a single cor-
porate but several ones together – nevertheless there is a 
sense making to call it crisis instead of fraud. It is cheaper 
to create sense making in nowadays with digital media 
and it is easy to certify this phenomenon through recent 
national elections around the world. One lesson to extract 
from it is that new big frauds could be still subtler to lay 
audience than priors. 
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